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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

-------------:

STATE OF UTAH I
Plaintiff-Respondent,

-vsKEITH WILBURT MURPHY,
Defendant-Appellant •

. i

RONALD BRENT BOUTWELL

o. Box 857
Hurricane, Utah 84737

P.

Attorney for Appellant
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,:
Case No.
16412

-vsKEITH WILBURT MURPHY,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant was charged by complaint and information
with one count of possession of a stolen vehicle, a second
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408

(1953), as amended.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was tried by a jury before the Honorable
Robert F. Owens in the Fifth Judicial District Court for
Iron County and found guilty as charged on February 15,

1979.

Following a pre-sentence report, a sentence of one

to fifteen years in the Utah State Prison was imposed.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmance of the lower cour:'
conviction and sentence.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On November 11, 197 8, while searching for a
stolen van, police discovered appellant at 400 North 80(
West in Cedar City sleeping in the rear of a brown 1975
Dodge van which matched the description of the vehicle
they were looking for

(R. at 19:

13-15, 17-18). 1

Appellant was awakened and then arrested (R. at 19: 16,
19) •

He was immediately advised of his rights pursuant

to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (R. at 19: 19).
Appellant claimed when he was arrested that his friend
"Mike" allowed him to sleep in the van but would give
no explanation of who "Mike" was or where he could be
reached (R. at 19: 21-22).

The keys to the van were in

the ignition although it was apparent that the lock had
been tampered with since the ignition switch came out
with the keys (R. at 19: 23-26).

1

Two transcripts are included within the record on
appeal (R). They are numbered separately from the
rest of the record and will be referred to by pag~
number as R. at
:
, the first number representing
the page of the record at which the particular fng
transcript begins and the second number represen 1
the page of the transcript referred to.
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Lori Pledger also testified that she had seen
appellant with the van several days before he was
arrested (R. at 19: 49).

It was stipulated that

appellant had been driving the van in which he was
arrested (R. at 19: 50).
It was also stipulated that the van in
which appellant was found had been missing from the

u & S Hotor Company parking lot for three days (R. at
19: 32-33).

A Utah vehicle registration card and

certificate of title were introduced and were stipulated
to pertain to the brown van in question (R. at 3, 19: 33).
Officer Houchen testified that he had contacted Robert
Robertson, shown on the title as owner of the van (R. at
19: 42).
Following the presentation of the state's
evidence, appellant moved to dismiss the charges claiming
that the state had failed to prove all the elements of
the crime.

The motion to dismiss was denied and the

state was allowed to amend the information to conform
to the evidence in that Robert and Raina Robertson were
shown as the owners of the van, not the U & S Motor
Company as the information had originally stated.
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Defendant then testified, although his
testimony was not made a part of the record on
appeal.
After deliberating, the jury found appellant
guilty as charged of receiving stolen property.

Follow·

ing a pre-sentence report, appellant was sentenced to
a term of one to fifteen years in the Utah State Prison,
ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANT 1 S MOTION TO DISMISS WAS
PROPERLY DENIED SINCE THE STATE HAD
ESTABLISHED A PRIMA FACIE CASE.
Utah Code Ann.

§

76-6-408 (1953), as amended,

provides:
A person commits theft if he
receives, retains, or disposes of the
property of another knowing that it
has been stolen, or believing that it
probably has been stolen.
The elements may thus be stated as:
(1)

the actor must receive, retain, or dispos:

of the property of another; and
(2)

the actor must know the property has beer

stolen or believe the property to probably have been
stolen.
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The evidence in the instant matter indicated
that appellant had been driving the van several days
before his arrest (R. at 19: 49).

Appellant was

sleeping in the van with the keys in the ignition the
morning he was arrested (R. at 19: 14-15, 23).

In

spite of his assertion that his friend "Mike" had
allowed him to sleep in the van, appellant would give
no indication as to who "Mike" was or where he could
be reached (R. at 19: 21-22).

There was certainly

enough evidence to reasonably inf er that appellant
retained or possessed the van.
It was stipulated that the van had been
missing for three days

(R. at 19: 32-33).

In Barnes

v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 839-840 (1973), the
United States Supreme Court approved of the following
jury instruction:
• possession of recently
stolen property, if not satisfactorily
explained, is ordinarily a circumstance
from which you may reasonably draw the
inference and find, in the light of the
surrounding circumstances shown by the
evidence of the case, that the person
in possession knew the property had
been stolen.

-5Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The Court also noted:
In the present case we deal
with a traditional common-law
inference deeply rooted in our law.
For centuries courts have instructed
juries that an inference may be drawn
from the fact of unexplained possession
of stolen goods.
Id. at 833.
The Utah Supreme Court has also noted:
• it is a fact of life that
one in possession of stolen property
who makes no explanation as to how he
came to be in possession is apt to be
under some adverse consideration as to
his honesty;and if he has an explanation
as to how he innocently came into
possession of the stolen property, he
would certainly improve his situation by
giving his account of how it happened to
the jury.
State v. Burr, 579 P.2d 331, 334 (Utah 1978).
Although the holding of the Court in

~·

Burr was that a defendant need not put on affirmative
evidence to rebut a presumption created by his possessic:
of stolen goods, it does not go so far as to rule out
the type of inference allowed in Barnes v. United S~
supra.

Appellant's unexplained possession on several

occasions of the van which was stipulated to have been
missing for several days plus the fact that the ignitio:
lock had been tampered with all could have reasonably
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indicated to the jury that appellant knew the van
was or probably was stolen.
In a similar case, the Wyoming Supreme
court noted that the widely accepted rule is that
possession of recently stolen goods alone is
damning evidence of guilt.

Russell v. State, 583

P.2d 690, 695 (Wyo. 1978).

That court also held:

When the State introduces
evidence on its case-in-chief from
which the jury may properly infer the
essential elements of the crime, the
State has then made out a "prima
face case," impregnable against a
motion for acquittal.
Id. at 695.

In the instant matter the State had
clearly presented evidence from which the jury
could have inferred the elements of the crime
charged.

Consequently, the lower court acted

properly in denying appellant's motion to
dismiss.

-7-
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POINT II.
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN
ALLOWING AN AMENDMENT TO THE INFORMATION
AT THE CLOSE OF THE STATE'S CASE AND
REFUSING TO ALLOW APPELLANT MORE TIME
TO MEET THE AMENDED INFORMATION.
Utah Code Ann.§ 77-17-3,

(1953, as amended),

provides:
An information may be amended, without
leave of court, in any matter of form
or substance at any time before the defendant
pleads thereto.
It may also be amended
in any matter of form or substance, by leave
of court, at any time after the defendant
has pleaded to the merits, or during the
trial.
In case an amendment is allowed
after a plea or during the trial, the
court shall give the defendant such
reasonable time as may be necessary to
meet the new matter set up in the amendment
(emphasis added) .
This Court considered this statute in State v. Rohletter, 1!:
1

Utah 452, 160 P.2d 963, 964,

(1945):

Section 105-17-3, Utah Code Ann.,
(1943), governs amendments in criminal
cases.
It provides that an information
may be amended with leave of the court
as to matter of substance or form
during the trial.
However, in State v.
Rickenburg, 58 Utah 270, 198 P.2d 767
(1921), we held that under this statute
no amendment could be made which would
essentially alter the nature of the
case, so to prejudice the defendant in
making his defense. This was affirmed
in State v. Caputo, 69 Utah 266, 254 P. 141
(1927).
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see also State v. Sommers, Utah No. 16016, filed July 6,
1979.

A recent Illinois case has also indicated that:
Variance between allegations of a
charge and evidence which can affect
a criminal trial are limited to differences
between the pleading of essential elements
of a crime and the proof . . . (cites
omitted) . . . To vitiate a criminal
trial, however, a variance must be
material and of such character that it
mislead a defendant in the making of his
defense or exposes him to double jeopardy
. . . . The variance must result in
substantial injury to a defendant either
by causing a jury to be misled or by
hindering the defendant in the intelligent
presentation of his case.
Where
property of another is involved, a variance
between allegations of ownership and proof
is not fatal if evidence shows that rights
of possession and ownership of t:1e property
are in some person, legal or natural, other
than the defendant.

People v. Bristow, 8 Ill. App. 3d 798, 291 N.E. 2d 189, 192
(1972).

Under Utah Code Ann. § 77-21-8 (1953), as amended,
all an information is required to state is the name of the
offense, the statutory designation of the offense, or the
basic definition of the offense with which the defendant has
been charged.

consequently, an information for receiving

stolen goods does not need to identify who actually owns
the property in question under Utah Code Ann. § 77-21-16
(1953, as amended) , which states:
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An information or indictment
need contain no allegation of the
ownership of any property, unless
such allegation is necessary to
charge the offense under section
77-21-8.
Moreover, Utah Code Ann., § 77-21-20, states:

"An informa:r

or indictment need not state any matter not necessary to
be proved."

The elements of receiving stolen property don::

include specific ownership of the property, only if that
ownership is with someone other than the defendant.

Since

ownership of the van was not a necessary allegation in the
information, any allegation to that effect can be regarded
as surplusage.

(Utah Code Ann. § 77-21-42 (1953), as amende

"Any allegation unnecessary under the existing law or under
the provisions of this chapter, may, if contained in an
information, indictment, or bill of particulars, be disregam
as surplusage.")
A change in a portion of the information which was
surplusage could hardly be characterized as changing the
nature of the case.

The same property was still alleged

as having been received; the same crime was still charged:
the same proof was still relied upon to establish the
elements of the crime.

It had already been stipulated that

the van had been missing from the u
for three days (R. at 19, 32-33).

&

s Motor parking lot

It was apparent that the

van did not belong to the defendant.

The change of the
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'

alleged identity of the owners of the van to conform to
the proof did not alter appellant's case.
Additional support for the lower court's action in
allowing the prosecution to amend the information following
the presentation of its case is found in Utah Code Ann.,
§

77-21-43 ( 1953, as amended):
(2) No variance between
those allegations of an information,
indictment or bill of particulars,
which state the particulars of the
offense, whether amended or not, and
the evidence offered in support
thereof shall be qrounds for the acquittal
of the defendant. The court may at any
time cause the information, indictment
or bill of particulars to be amended
in respect to any such variance, to
conform to the evidence.
(3) If the court is of the
opinion that the defendant has been
prejudiced in this defense upon the
merits by any such defect, imperfection
or omission or by any variance the court
may because of such defect, imperfection,
omission or variance, unless the defendant
objects, postpone the trial, to be had
before the same or another jury on such
terms as the court considers proper.
In
determining whether the defendant has
been prejudiced in his defense upon the
merits, the court shall consider all
the circumstances of the case and the
entire course of the prosecution.
(4) No appeal, or motion made after
verdict, based on any such defect, imperfection, omission or variance shall
be sustained unless it is affirmatively
shown that the defendant was in fact
prejudiced thereby in his defense upon
the merits.
(emphasis added) .
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'

The lower court considered appellant's motion to dismiss a'
r..

objection to the variance and found no prejudice.

The

effect of the change was to make appellant feel compelled
to testify (Appellant's Brief at p. 14) , and to take away
his argument that the state had failed to show ownership
in someone other than appellant.

Neither of these effects

would so substantially prejudice appellant as to require
reversal or a new trial.
Appellant also claims the prosecutor acted

~b~

faith in withholding a bill of sale showing that the van in
question had been sold by the Robertson's to U
Company (R. at 18).

&

S Motor

A consideration of the bill of sale ani

the certificates of title (R. at 3), indicates that who had
legal title was in doubt.

As has been noted above, it made!

no difference to the state's case who had title to the van.
The state needed only to show that the van was missing from
someone.

The change in the information did not undermine '
I

any affirmative defense of appellant.
The bill of sale was not evidence "favorable to
appellant."

Appellant claims that had he been given more

time, he could have obtained the bill of sale and other
:witnesses and shown that u

&

s Motor Company owned the van,

.i
I

the Robertsons (Appellant's brief at p. 9).
to see how this would have helped appellant.

I t is difflcul:,
I t would simpi

e explic
have made the fact that the van had been stolen mor
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-

l:

There was no reason to have delayed the trial or
to have disallowed the change.

Consequently, the trial

court acted properly in allowing the amendment to the
information at the close of the state's case and refusing
to allow more time for appellant to meet the amended information.
CONCLUSION
Appellant's motion to dismiss at the close of
the state's case was properly denied since the state had made
out a prima facie case of receiving stolen property.

There

was no error in allowing the information to be amended to
conform to the evidence since the portion changed was
surplusage ·and did not change the nature of the offense
charged.

Moreover, appellant's case was.not prejudiced by

the change.

Appellant was not harmed by the failure of the

prosecutor to introduce evidence since the evidence was not
clearly favorable to him and was not central to the elements
of the crime charged.
Accordingly, the conviction and sentence of the
lower court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
I

WILLIAM W. BARRETT
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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